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PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
The privilege granted to the physician-patient relationship is found
in Chapter 51, section 5.1.' There was no physician-patient privilege at
common law and prior to this statute's enactment in 1959 no privilege
existed in Illinois.2 Illinois was one of the later states to give some protec-
tion to communications between a physician and patient. The statutory
protection given to this relationship in other states was often criticized.
8
In some circumstances, it appeared the intended benefits of the physician-
patient privilege were outweighed by the resulting hardship and abuses it
caused. But unlike most other states whose statutes, at least before many
were amended, are an unqualified grant of privilege, the Illinois statute
has many exceptions. This is apparently an attempt to give some protection
to the physician-patient relationship, but at the same time exclude pro-
tection where injustice or unnecessary hardship is likely to occur.
The purpose of the statute is to promote the patient's disclosure of
intimate facts necessary for correct treatment by a physician which may be
withheld if a patient fears future publication. 4 A policy determination has
been made that disclosure for treatment is more important than the as-
certainment of the truth in the course of litigation. The statute gives the
patient the opportunity to disclose intimate facts necessary for treatment
1 No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he may
have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, necessary to
enable him professionally to serve such patient, except only (1) in trials for
homicide when the disclosure related directly to the fact or immediate circum-
stances of the homicide, (2) in actions, civil or criminal, against the physician for
malpractice, (3) with the expressed consent of the patient, or in the case of his
death or disability, of his personal representative or other person authorized to
sue for personal injury or of the beneficiary of an insurance policy on his life,
health, or physical condition. (4) in all civil suits brought by or against the
patient, his personal representative, a beneficiary under a policy of insurance or
the executor or administrator of his estate wherein the patient's physical or mental
condition is an issue, (5) upon an issue as to the validity of a document as will of
the patient, (6) in any criminal action where the charge is either murder by
abortion, attempted abortion.... In the event of a conflict between the applica-
tion of subsection (1), (2), (4), (5) or (6) of this Section and Section 5.2 to a specific
situation, the provisions of Section 5.2 shall control. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51,
§ 5.1 (1967).
2 Cronin v. Court of Honor, 187 Ill. App. 480 (1st Dist. 1914); Gill v. Modern Wood-
men of America, 221 Ill. App. 388 (4th Dist. 1920); 37 I.L.P. Witnesses § 61 n.6; Gard,
Illinois Evidence Manual Rule 441 (1963); Oblinger, Privileged Communications Between
Physician and Patient in Illinois, 37 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 97 (1960).
3 See Leusink v. O'Donnell, 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W.2d 675 (1949); 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2380a (McNaughton rev. 1961); Physician-Patient Privilege: A Need to Revise the Arizona
Law, 6 Ariz. L. Rev. 292 (1965); Legislation Notes, Privileged Communications-Abrogation
of the Physician-Patient Privilege to Protect the Battered Child, 15 De Paul L. Rev. 453
(1966); A Critical Examination of Some Evidentiary Privileges: A Symposium, 56 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 206 (1961); Ohio's Physician-Patient Privilege in Personal Injury Cases-Time for
Reform, 16 W. Res. L. Rev. 334 (1965).
4 Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1948); Brackney v. Fogle, 156 Ind. 535,
60 N.E. 303 (1901); Leusink v. O'Donnell, supra note 3; 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2380
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
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without having to sacrifice his privacy. If the purpose of the statute is to
protect the patient's health and privacy, it follows that a patient can
waive his privilege.5 This appears to be the position taken by the Illinois
legislation, which provides that a patient may waive the protection of the
statute.6 But in addition, the courts have held that a patient can not claim
the benefit of the statute when his conduct is inconsistent with a claim
of privacy.
The physician-patient privilege is subject to abuse when the patient
is instituting the litigation. The patient is able to waive his privilege if
the testimony of a physician is favorable and then claim privacy to exclude
the unfavorable testimony of other physicians. This abuse has been pre-
vented in other jurisdictions by finding that a patient has completely
waived his privilege to the subject matter he voluntarily discloses.7 The
subject matter which the patient disclosed by allowing testimony by any
doctor is no longer privileged and all doctors who have treated the patient
for the same condition can be made to testify. The courts have reasoned
5 In Cronin v. Court of Honor, supra note 2, the court said, in dictum, that the
privilege is for the patient, and where he has waived it the physician may not claim the
privilege. The court said in Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wiler, 100 Ind. 92, 100 (1885):
S. .  Notwithstanding the absolutely prohibiting form of our present statute,
we think it confers a privilege which the patient, for whose benefit the provision
is made, may claim or waive. It gives no right to the physician to refuse to
testify . ..
Accord, Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1948). See Angerstein v. Milwaukee
Monument Co., 169 Wis. 502, 173 N.W. 215 (1919); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2386
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
6 Except where the privilege does not apply by statutory exception, the statute
reads, "No physician or surgeon shall be permitted (emphasis added) to disclose any
information ... except ... (3) with the express consent of the patient [or his personal
representative]. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5.1 (1967). Compare the wording in other
provisions:
"In civil and criminal cases .. . a patient or his authorized representative and a
psychiatrist or his authorized representative have the privilege to refuse to disclose
(emphasis added) .. " Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1967). Does this mean that a psychiatrist
can waive the privilege to refuse without the patient's consent or even at the patient's
objection? Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 91 , § 406 provides "No psychologist shall disclose any infor-
mation he may have acquired . . . except only - . . (4) with the expressed consent of the
client. . . .This wording indicates the privilege is for the benefit of the patient only.
7 This problem is illustrated by the following case of Schlarb v. Henderson, 211 Ind.
1, 4 N.E.2d 205 (1936). There was a question of establishing injuries sustained in an
auto accident. After the accident, the plaintiff was operated on for an appendix operation
and certain tissue was also removed for examination. Testimony was introduced that the
appendix was not chronically involved with the injury caused by the accident.
Three doctors made microscopic examinations, and the plaintiff sought to exclude the
evidence of one doctor who thought the injury was the result of the patient's appendix.
The court held the plaintiff had waived his privilege by a voluntary disclosure of the
findings of the two physicians. The patient may not choose his version of the injury with
a claim of privacy to exclude testimony of an adverse witness. Accord State v. Sapp, 356
Mo. 705, 203 S.W.2d 425 (1947). In Steinberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 263 N.Y. 45,
188 N.E. 152 (1933), the patient was not allowed to exclude the testimony of the doctor
who treated him three years earlier for the same condition. See Cretney v. Woodman
Accident Co., 196 Wis. 29, 219 N.W. 448 (1928); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2390 nn.3 & 4
(McNaughton rev. 1961); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 1244 §§ 3 & 4 (1966).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
that there is no longer any reason to protect the privacy of the patient by
preventing the publication of information acquired by a doctor if the
patient has already allowed publication on the same condition. It appears
that Illinois will allow all physicians who examined the patient for the
same condition to testify if the patient calls any of the physicians to testify.8
The patient is prevented from giving selected testimony, but this still
places the opposition at a serious disadvantage for two reasons. First, the
patient may not require medical testimony of prior treatment to sustain
his claim or defense.9 If there is no testimony of prior medical treatment,
the opposition will not be able to say the patient has waived his privilege.
Second, the patient may find it necessary to allow testimony concerning
prior medical treatment, but the patient does not waive his privilege until
trial. In the interim, the patient may claim the privilege during pre-trial
discovery to prevent the opposition from preparing its case properly or to
induce the opposition to make a favorable settlement. 10 The patient is in
the enviable position of being able to derive a benefit from a privilege he
may waive at the trial.
The Illinois statute apparently places the patient and his opponent on
a more equal footing. The Illinois statute provides that a physician shall
not disclose any information except in civil suits brought by or against"
the patient, his personal representative, a beneficiary under a policy of
8 In People v. Givans, 83 Ill. App. 2d 423, 429, 228 N.E.2d 123, 126 (Ist Dist. 1967),
the defendant raised the defense of insanity. The defendant sought to exclude the
testimony of one psychiatrist as a privileged communication. The court said,
. . . . By calling his own doctor to the stand, defendant waived his right to
assert the privilege. . . . (H)e "could not be permitted to call as witnesses only
those doctors whom he desired to call, and then claim the right to object as to
other doctors who treated and examined him for the same condition."
There is no apparent reason why the same reasoning should not apply to the physician-
patient privilege. See Gard, Illinois Evidence Manual Rule 441 (1963).
9 The patient does not destroy his privilege by calling physicians as expert witnesses
or testifying to his physical condition generally. Only when the patient must testify to
treatment he received or when he must call a physician who has treated him is the priv-
ilege destroyed. In McLaughlin v. Massachusetts Indem. Ins. Co., 85 Ohio App. 511, 84
N.E.2d 114 (1948), the insurance company claimed the patient had waived his privilege
attaching to Army service records by testifying to the diagnosis of his physical condition
when discharged from the Army. The court found the patient would not waive his priv-
ilege unless he was testifying from information derived from his medical reports. The
court found he was testifying from information he had seen elsewhere. See 8 Wigmore,
Evidence §§ 2389 & 2390 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 310 (1957).
10 Padovani v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.R.D. 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1959) (plaintiffs
bringing the action does not waive the privilege and the privilege applies during pre-trial
discovery); Ohio's Physician-Patient Privilege in Personal Injury Cases-Time for Reform,
16 W. Res. L. Rev. 334 (1965).
11 Whenever an insurance company seeks to recover funds which it feels may have
been paid on the basis of erroneous medical reports or other information, it must necessarily
bring the action against the patient. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Heaton, 20 O.L.Abs. 454 (1935)
(action by an insurance company to cancel a life insurance policy on the ground of fraud
in the application; the medical history of the patient was privileged); 41 N.C.L. Rev. 627
(1963).
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insurance, or an executor or administrator where the patient's physical or
mental condition is an issue. By comparison, section 5.2, which confers a
privilege on psychiatrist-patient communications, requires that the patient
introduce his mental condition as an element of his claim or defense.
The legislature intended a different treatment for each relationship. Section
5.1 provides that in case there is a conflict between the protection offered
in sections 5.1 and 5.2, 5.2 should prevail. One Illinois court has indicated
that either party may place the patient's physical or mental condition in
issue, thereby compelling the physician to testify at trial. The same court
held that only the patient could put his mental condition in issue and
thereby allow a psychiatrist to testify.
12
12 It would appear by the wording used in the Illinois statute granting the physician-
patient privilege that the patient's physical or mental condition can be raised by either
the plaintiff or defendant. The physician is able to testify in civil suits where the patient's
physical or mental condition is an issue. The statute does not say who must put the
condition at issue. See subsection 4 supra note 1, for statutory wording. Compare this
with the companion statute, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1967), which relates to the
psychiatrist-patient relationship. The revelant portion of the statute says, "There is no
privilege under this section for any relevant communications ... (c) in a civil or administra-
tive proceeding in which the patient introduced his mental condition as an element of his
claim or defense ......
In Webb v. Quincy City Lines, Inc., 73 Ill. App. 2d 405, 219 N.E.2d 165 (4th Dist.
1966), the plaintiff got her arm caught in the bus door. Her physician suggested that she
see a psychiatrist because of her reaction to the accident. The offer of proof showed she
may have imagined part of her mental anguish. The defendant sought to have the
psychiatrist testify to show that part of her alleged mental anguish was imaginary. The
defendant argued that a claim for pain and suffering put her mental condition at issue.
The court found that a claim for pain and suffering was not sufficient to put the patient's
mental condition at issue. It is assumed that the defendant then argued that if she did
not put her mental condition at issue, the defendant had done so by claiming that her
mental condition was relevant to her claim for pain and suffering. The court answered
by saying:
.... We would further note that the legislature differentiates between the general
physician-patient statute, Ill. Rev. Stats. 1965, c 51, § 5.1, and the psychiatrist-
patient statute, by providing that in any conflict between the two, the provisions
of § 5.2 shall control. We think we are under compulsion, therefore, to read § 5.2
literally and to hold that the privilege exists unless "mental condition" is
specifically made a part of either the claim or defense [of the patient]. It was not
so placed in issue here. 73 Ill. App. 2d at 408.
It appears Illinois has adopted the minority, but rapidly increasing view, that a
patient waives his privilege by bringing a suit. The theory is the patient has disclosed his
ailment and the repugnancy of disclosure no longer exists. The Illinois statute would
indicate that there is a waiver beyond the issues which the patient discloses. See Gard,
Illinois Evidence Manual Rules 441 & 441A.
The following cases exemplify the view that the physician-patient privilege is waived
to some extent by instituting a suit. Burlage v. Haudenshield, 42 F.R.D. 397 (N.D. Iowa
1967) (waiver of privilege during pre-trial discovery if disclosure of privileged information
at trial is reasonably probable). In the case of City and County of San Francisco v. Superior
Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P. 226 (1951), Judge Traynor said a patient waives the physician-
patient privilege by bringing a suit for his personal injuries. This case was followed in
San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 451, 393 P.2d 925 (1961).
A physician may be compelled to turn over medical records for discovery and submit to
the taking of depositions. See State v. Swinburne, 324 S.W2d 746 (Mo. 1959); State ex Tel.
McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968). (this case changes Missouri law in civil cases.
A patient may not claim the privilege during discovery if the physician-patient privilege
must be waived at trial to prove injuries); City of Portsmouth v. Cilumbrello, 204 Va.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
What is not clear from the statute itself is at what stage the defendant
can put the patient's physical or mental condition in issue. It would seem
that disclosure should be allowed during pre-trial discovery; the rules for
discovery seem to support this view.' 3
It appears that under the exceptions to section 5.1 a patient would
waive his privilege by instituting a suit where his physical or mental condi-
tion is an issue. Having waived his privilege, it is still necessary to determine
the extent to which the privilege is waived by litigation. In the usual
situation, the defendant is trying to obtain medical information concerning
treatment for a condition he has allegedly caused. Sometimes prior medical
history is either useful or necessary to show the plaintiff's claim is for pre-
existing injuries. In the latter situation the court must decide if the phy-
sician may be asked to testify, or his records subpoenaed, in regard to
prior treatment where the treatment was not for the mental or physical
condition in litigation. The few courts which have considered this question
have generally answered in the negative. 14 However, in Illinois it would
appear the patient's entire history is subject to disclosure regardless of
when and for what reason the patient sought professional assistance.15
It appears that only a relationship between the suit and a prior phys-
ical or mental condition must exist. A relationship has been found when
an accident allegedly revived an old neurosis or when an accident sup-
posedly caused an impairment to the plaintiff's left arm and leg which was
already disabled by a sclerosis condition.16 But the guidelines for the
11, 129 S.E.2d 31 (1963). (entire privilege waived by bringing action); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d
912 §§ 3, 6 & 8 (1968).
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. l10A, § 201 (b) 2 (1967) provides that "All matters that are
privileged against disclosure at the trial . . . are privileged against disclosure through
any discovery procedure." If information would not be privileged at trial then there
should be no protection during pre-trial discovery.
14 The authority on this point agrees a waiver of the privilege for the physical or
mental condition at issue is generally not a waiver for past unrelated or unconnected
injuries. Most of the cases on this topic are discussed in 5 A.L.R.3d 1244 § 4 (1966). See
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2389 n.1 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
15 In Rylko v. Katz, 84 Ill. App. 2d 93, 228 N.E.2d 135 (1st Dist. 1967) an old
neurosis was allegedly revived by an automobile accident. Some evidence was given con-
cerning wounds and neurosis suffered in the Second World War. The court held that
the defendant had the right to put the plaintiff's Army medical records in evidence. But
this was only an abstract decision and the reasoning of the court is not given. If Illinois
adopts the view that the physician-patient privilege is waived by bringing a suit, there is
no reason, other than policy, why all evidence should not be disclosed which relates to
the issues of the case. See State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, supra note 12 (all relevant past
history is available for discovery).
In Rylko, it perhaps could have been argued that the patient waived his privilege
by his testimony of prior treatment. However, there is no showing to what extent the
patient testified to the prior injuries. Usually more than just a reference to general treat-
ment is necessary to waive the privilege by the patient's testimony. See note 9 supra; 8
Wigmore, Evidence § 2389 n.7 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Annot., 114 A.L.R. 798 (1938);
Annot., 98 A.L.R. 1284 (1935).
16 Rylko v. Katz supra note 15; Leusink v. O'Donnell, 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W.2d 675
(1949).
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relationship that must exist are described in such general terms as requiring
only a prior disability which affects the same part of the person.17
With this general standard, it will be necessary for the courts to
supervise the questioning of physicians and the examination of medical
records. This is especially true during pre-trial discovery when the proce-
dural safeguards of the courtroom are not available. An unsupervised rum-
maging through prior medical history would allow matters which have a
certain extortion value to be discovered. A person may not wish to bring a
legitimate suit if he feels unrelated but intimate and embarrassing infor-
mation will be opened to public scrutiny. A husband may not bring a suit
and risk having his wife discover that he was treated for a social disease
before their marriage.' 8
Many courts struggled with the question of who could waive the
privilege if the patient was either dead or incompetent. In actions to set
aside deeds made by infirm persons, or when the validity of a will is put
in question, often the only person available to testify on the issue of com-
petency or sanity is the attending physician.' 9 At the present time, either
by decision or statute, the physician-patient privilege has been made a
personal right which passes to the personal representative.20 This view
recognizes that the personal representative has an interest in preserving
the good name of the deceased and will not allow the disclosure of infor-
mation which would blemish the deceased's name.21 However, this view
also assumes the personal representative will act honestly and in good
faith. Such confidence is not always warranted. In actions involving the
validity of a will or deed, the person being sued is frequently the personal
representative and he can prevent medical testimony which is unfavorable
to his interest. By claiming the physician-patient privilege, the personal
representative can successfully conceal that a deed or will, beneficial to his
interest, was either made by someone mentally incompetent or procured
17 Leusink v. O'Donnell, supra note 16.
18 State ex rel. McNutt v. Keet, 432 S.W.2d 597 (Mo. 1968); Oblinger, Privileged
Communications Between Physician and Patient in Illinois, 37 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 97 (1960).
There is statutory authority for the courts to supervise discovery procedures to prevent
abuse. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 201 (c) (1967).
19 Illustrative of this problem is In re Coddington's Will, 307 N.Y. 181, 120 N.E.2d
777 (1954) where the history of the New York statute is traced. The dissent demonstrates
the testatrix was in reality incompetent, and this could have been shown if the statute
had been interpreted to allow the physician to testify.
20 Stayner v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1948); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2391
(McNaughton rev. 1961); Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 393 (1964).
Some courts take a different approach to this problem by finding that the physician
did not treat the patient for a mental illness. And the physician-patient privilege does not
apply to information which the physician acquired unless the information is necessary for
treatment. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2384 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
21 The New York statute provides that the physician-patient privilege may not be
waived if the testimony will bring shame to the name of the deceased. Meyers v. Supreme
Lodge K. P., 178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. 111 (1904).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
by fraud or undue influence.22 The personal representative's motives are
unquestioned, and it is presumed he acted to preserve the memory of the
deceased.
Where medical testimony is necessary, for example, in accidental
death policies to establish the decedent's cause of death or to rebut a
defense of suicide, beneficiaries of insurance policies might be unable to
recover in court actions if the personal representative would not or could
not waive the privilege.28 This presents a particularly anomalous situation.
The deceased expressed his intention to give a beneficiary a sum of money,
and the courts say the beneficiary is not to have the physician's testimony
to obtain his intended gift. In Illinois, the physician-patient privilege
should not be troublesome where the patient is either dead or disabled.
In such a case an exhaustive list of persons, which includes the beneficiary
of an insurance policy, are allowed to waive the privilege. A physician is
also allowed to testify in all suits brought by or against the personal rep-
resentative or the beneficiary where the decedent's physical or mental
condition is an issue. Moreover, the statute further provides that a physician
may testify anytime the validity of a document, such as a will, is at issue.24
The physician-patient privilege is for the benefit of the patient and the
Illinois statute says this privilege may be waived by the express consent of
the patient. The statute does not define express consent.25 If the prior dis-
cussion is correct, that the patient can not claim the physician-patient
privilege where his physical or mental condition is made an issue in the
case, it would seem that express consent is probably not necessary where the
patient has an interest in the litigation, since in most cases the other excep-
tions would remove the protection of the statute. Express consent is still
significant where the patient does not have an interest in the case and is
called only as a witness or is not present in court at all.
When the patient is present only as a witness, the patient can claim the
privilege to avoid personally testifying and his express consent would be
necessary to obtain the physician's testimony. If the patient is not present
22 Stayner v. Nye, supra note 20; Pence v. Meyers, 180 Ind. 282, 101 N.E. 716 (1913)
(if the personal representative does not waive the privilege, the physician cannot testify to
set aside the will).
28 Many statutes do not allow the beneficiary to waive the physician-patient privilege.
See Shuman v. Supreme Lodge Knight of Honor, 110 Iowa 480, 81 N.W. 717 (1900);
Thompson v. National Life & Accident Co., 21 Ohio Op. 497, 37 N.E.2d 621 (Ohio App.
1941).
In Scott v. Smith, 171 Ind. 453, 85 N.E. 774 (1908), the court said, the executor could
only waive the deceased's privilege to protect the interests of the estate. Therefore, even
if the executor were willing to waive the privilege, in some cases it is doubtful that the
executor could waive the privilege to assist a beneficiary where the proceeds do not pass
through the estate.
24 See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5.1 subsections 3, 4, & 5, supra note 1.
25 For possible meanings of "express waiver" see 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2388 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961).
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in court and has not given his express consent, the physician can refuse to
testify to preserve the patient's privilege.2 6 This inability to obtain any
information concerning matters which have occurred within the physician-
patient relationship has been troublesome in malpractice and abortion
cases. Without the testimony of either the patient or the physician, evidence
is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain in malpractice and abortion cases.
In addition, unless the physician can disclose treatment he has given, how
can he defend a malpractice sUit?27 To get around these problems the stat-
ute removes the physician-patient privilege in civil or criminal actions
against the physician for malpractice and in criminal actions for abortions.
28
The physician-patient privilege is available only if the patient is able
to establish that the status of physician-patient existed. The Illinois statute
says, "No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any informa-
tion he may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional char-
acter, necessary to enable him to professionally serve such patient."
29
26 In Darling v.'Pacific Elec. Ry., 197 Cal. 702, 242 P. 703 (1925), the court said the
physician was able to claim the patient's privilege. But see 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2386
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Professor Wigmore says that the patient must eventually claim
the privilege. This conflict is moot because usually the patient will claim the privilege.
27 In civil suits for malpractice the patient could prevent the physician from defend-
ing his case by claiming the physician-patient privilege. Aspy v. Botkins, 160 Ind. 170, 66
N.E. 462 (1902) (the patient was able to withhold the testimony of other physicians who
treated patient later); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2385 n.3 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Havener,
Malpractice Medical Discovery v. Physician-Patient Privilege-Something's Got to Give!,
35 Ins. Co. J. 41 (1968). For the criminal problems in malpractice suits see 8 Wigmore,
Evidence § 2385 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
28 See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5.1 subsections 1, 2 & 6 (1967), supra note 1.
29 Miller v. Miller, 47 Ind. App. 239, 94 N.E. 243 (1911) (the physician was allowed to
testify regarding casual portions of conversations in which the deceased promised to pay
his daughter for services); Kirkpatrick v. Milks, 257 Wis. 549, 44 N.W.2d 574 (1950) (where
the doctor was a witness to the execution of a note the court said he was not present to
render services); Frederick v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 13 Cal. App. 2d 585, 57 P.2d 235 (1936)
(statements taken by interns for admission records are not privileged because they are not
necessary to prescribe or act for the patient). Contra, People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 157
N.Y.S.2d 558, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956) (prior history is necessary for treatment and division
of duties does not defeat the privilege).
Examination made for purposes of obtaining insurance, to obtain evidence or exami-
nations made by doctors to give expert testimony at trials are not excluded by the
physician-patient privilege because the information obtained is not to help serve the
patient professionally. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 215 et. seq. (1967) (describes the statutory
procedure for compelling physical examinations for use at trial); Edington v. Mutual
Life Insurance Co., 67 N.Y. 185 (1876) (information obtained during a physical examination
to obtain insurance was not privileged); McGinty v. Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen, 166
Wis. 83, 164 N.W. 249 (1919). In City of Racine v. Woiteshek, 251 Wis. 404, 29 N.W.2d
752 (1947), the physician took a blood sample to determine alcohol content. There was
no privilege because the physician was acting to obtain evidence not to serve the patient.
See Annot., 107 A.L.R. 1495 (1937).
The requirement that information be obtained to enable the physician to profes-
sionally serve does have one exception. Information which is obtained for medical research
is not obtained to professionally serve the patient but is obtained for scientific purposes.
Research information is made confidential in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, §§ 101 & 102 (1967).
All information which is gathered becomes confidential except "the original medical
records pertaining to the patient ... ." Unlike section 5.1, this section gives unqualified
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The statute gives the privilege to the relationship which exists between
a physician or surgeon and a patient. The words "physician or surgeon" are
generally given a narrow interpretation and some doubt exists if an intern
is within the definition.30
The statute further requires that the information be obtained while
the physician is acting in his professional capacity. The mere presence of a
physician and an injured person, even though the physician renders assis-
tance, is not sufficient to establish the physician-patient relationship.8 1
Neither is payment nor lack of payment the determining factor.32 Usually it
is the conduct of the physician as he renders treatment that determines if
the status exists. Would a physician behave in a particular manner if he
were not acting in his professional capacity? For this reason the physician-
patient status has been found to exist even where the patient resists treat-
ment or is unconscious.33
It is interesting to note that the statute does not require confidential
protection to medical information. If original medical records were not excluded from
sections 101 and 102 the patient could avoid the exceptions to section 5.1 by turning his
medical records over to a research organization. See Gard, Illinois Evidence Manual Rule
441 (1963).
30 Rarogiewicz v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 242 N.Y. 590, 152 N.E. 440
(1926) (evidence of intern excluded, but he was acting as agent of physician); Weis v. Weis,
147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d 245 (1947) (a nurse is not within the privilege even if she is
acting as an agent of the physician); Gulf M. & N. Ry. v. Willis, 171 Miss. 732, 157 So.
899 (1934) (a dentist is not within this privilege); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2283 n.3 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961). Similar problems exist for chiropractors, osteopaths and christian
science practitioners, but would the latter be able to claim the priest-penitent privilege?
See Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 742 (1956).
31 In Griflths v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 171 N.Y. 106, 63 N.E. 808 (1902), the plaintiff
was injured by a cable car and was taken to a nearby drug store where he was given first
aid treatment by a physician. The physician also rode part way to the hospital in the
ambulance. The court found the physician was only rendering temporary assistance and
no physician-patient relationship was established.
32 Pennsylvania R.R. v. Hough, 88 Ind. App. 601, 161 N.E. 705 (1928) (doctor of
employer cannot testify about an employee where the relationship of physician-patient
exists); Louisville, etc. Traction Co. v. Snead, 49 Ind. App. 16, 93 N.E. 177 (1910) (appellant
sent doctor to attend those injured in an accident); Bauch v. Schultz, 109 Misc. 548, 180
N.Y.S. 188 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (it is immaterial that patient did not pay for services); Casson
v. Schoenfeld, 166 Wis. 401, 166 N.W. 23 (1918) (doctor of state institution could not
testify regarding patients sanity because treatment and care is part of the institution duties).
33 North American Union v. Oleske, 64 Ind. App. 435, 116 N.E. 68 (1917) (the patient
was unconscious). Meyer v. Supreme Lodge K. P., 178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. 111 (1904) (patient
trying to commit suicide resisted treatment and was uncooperative). In Adler v. State, 239
Ind. 68, 154 N.E.2d 716 (1958), a physician took a blood sample to determine blood type
for a transfusion of an unconscious accident victim. Part of the sample drawn was later
used to run an alcohol test for a later drunk driving prosecution. This information was
held inadmissible because the doctor was acting as a physician when he took the blood
sample and it was necessary to professionally serve the patient.
There is no doubt that if a separate blood sample had been drawn by another
physician the evidence would have been admissible by the rule in Schmerber v. State of
California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966). See People v. Downs, 5 App. Div. 2d 935,
172 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sup. Ct. 1958) and City of Racine v. Woiteshek, 251 Wis. 404, 29 N.W.2d
752 (1947).
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information. Any information which he may acquire in attending the pa-
tient in a professional character is within the physician-patient privilege.
This language is broad enough to include information obtained through
observation, examination, x-rays, tests or conversation. The purpose of the
statute is to protect information. For this reason physician's records and
reports are also privileged in order to prevent the indirect disclosure of
information which the statute seeks to protect.
3 4
However, information acquired is not privileged unless two other qual-
ifications are met. The statute requires that (1) information be acquired
while the physician is attending the patient and (2) the information must
be "necessary to enable him to professionally serve such patient .... .35
These requirements will make the status of physician-patient more difficult
to establish. By comparison, the Indiana statute only requires that informa-
tion be obtained by physicians "in the course of their professional busi-
ness."3 6 In the case of Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Walas,37 a physician observed a
patient in an emergency room vomiting and formed the opinion the patient
was drunk. The information was learned before the physician was assigned
to the patient. The court said the information was gained by a person who
was engaged in the duties of a physician and the information was privileged.
The information was neither obtained while the physician was attending
the patient nor was the information necessary to professionally serve the
patient.
One troublesome area of the physician-patient privilege has not been
mentioned and there is no Illinois case on this point. The statute is silent
on what effect the presence of third parties has on the privilege. It is
probably without question that third parties who are not necessary for
treatment may testify as to what they heard or saw,33 but it is usually the
expert testimony of the physician which is sought. It is the effect that the
presence of third parties has on the physician-patient relationship that is
important.
84 The same conclusion is reached in In re Coddington's Will, 307 N.Y. 181, 120
N.E.2d 777 (1954), where the court interpreted an early New York statute with wording
similar to the wording of the Illinois statute. See Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1124 (1939); Annot.,
75 A.L.R. 378 "(1931); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2384 (McNaughton rev. 1961). But see
Leusink v. O'Donnell, 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W.2d 675 (1949) (physician's reports but not
x-rays are within the protection of the statute).
835 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2283 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
36 Burns' Ind. Stat. § 2-1714 (1964 Replacement).
37 192 Ind. 369, 135 N.E. 150 (1922).
38 Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, 2 F. Supp. 203
(N.D. Cal. 1933) (court indicates wife could be compelled to testify about treatment given
to her husband); Springer v. Byram, 137 Ind. 15, 36 N.E. 361 (1893); 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2381 n.3 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Compare the wording in Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 51, § 5.2 (1967) which provides enumerated
instances where third parties can be prevented "from disclosing, communications relating
to diagnosis or treatment of the patient's mental condition .. "
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Generally, if the third party is present and necessary for treatment, the
physician-patient privilege is extended to the third party also.3 9 But where
third parties who are not necessary for treatment are present, the entire
privilege may be destroyed. 40 The physician-patient privilege was conceived
to allow intimate disclosures without fear of future publication. It is a
privilege to promote confidence. Where groups of people are present, courts
have held the privilege never existed because the patient never intended the
conversation to be confidential.41
There are only a few cases which tend to show when, and how, the
Illinois statute is to be applied. When deciding future cases, the courts will
not be unduly limited by prior decisions. In other states, the current trend
in regard to the physician-patient privilege has been one of general dis-
favor.42 This general attitude should be considered before a claim of phy-
sician-patient privilege is pursued with any vigor. This attitude, if adopted
by the Illinois courts, would have special significance because the Illinois
statute lends itself to a construction which could make the physician-patient
privilege an illusion in civil cases.
43
ROBERT W. WEBB
89 North American Union v. Oleske, 64 Ind. App. 435, 116 N.E. 68 (1917); Meyer v.
Supreme Lodge K. P., 178 N.Y. 63, 70 N.E. 111 (Ct. App. 1904); People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d
133, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956).
40 Murphy v. Board of Police Comm'rs, 2 Cal. App. 468, 83 P. 577 (1905). Although
the court never answered the question directly, it indicated that the doctor could be
compelled to testify as to disclosures made at one visit where the wife was present with
the husband. Compare a later case, applying California law, Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia, supra note 38, where the court indicated the privilege
was not destroyed, but third parties could be compelled to testify.
41 Horowitz v. Sacks, 89 Cal. App. 336, 265 P. 281 (1928) (three people present during
house call); Baker v. Whittaker, 133 Ind. App. 347, 182 N.E.2d 442 (1962) (seven present
during house call, the doctor was a friend, and one purpose of the call was to determine
if she was competent to convey land).
42 Masonic Mut. Ben. Assn. v. Beck, 77 Ind. 203, 210 (1881), "It (the statute) was
intended to remove from the law a reproach which had been long felt and often expressed
by judges, and it should be interpreted and enforced in a liberal spirit, with a view to
effectuate its purpose."
Compare a later Indiana case Stanyer v. Nye, 227 Ind. 231, 85 N.E.2d 496 (1948),
where the court said statutes in derogation of the common law will be strictly construed
where they interfere with the ascertainment of the truth. In Leusink v. O'Donnell, 255 Wis.
627, 632, 39 N.W.2d 675 (1949), the court expressed its feelings for the statute when it said,
"The reason of the rule of the statute, as far as it has any .. " But see Howard v. Porter,
240 Iowa 153, 35 N.W.2d 837 (1949), where the court says a liberal construction should
be given to the statute to carry out its manifest purpose.
43 Gard, Illinois Evidence Manual Rule 441 (1963). Judge Gard believes the statutory
exceptions are so comprehensive that very little of the privilege is left.
